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The Trend of Foreign Direct Investment movement: Did Unintended Nation 
Brand of legal-families play an instrumental role? 
 
Abstract 
 
Combining the suggestion from Fan (2006) that a nation can have a brand image without 
deliberating efforts of nation branding and the work from Klerman et. al. (2011) on Colonial 
History and effects on legal systems, we view that legal-systems could be an unintended nation 
brand that could instrumentally affect Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) activitives.  We classify 
193 countries according to their Colonial History or no-Colonial History into 5 legal-families.  
Applying Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) on a set of panel data, our empirical 
evidence shows that legal-families play an instrumental role in explaining FDI activities. The 
paper opens up a new ground of research on ‘unintended’ nation brand of which the nation 
branding literature largely focus on designed-nation-brand, and on FDI area in which we 
introduce a new determinant in addition to the traditional determinants that have been reported 
in the FDI literature.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most literature on Nation Branding is on how a country or a place make some efforts to create a 
distinguished brand following a designed plan or strategies of the local government. The purpose 
of doing so is to make the places more attractive to businesses and tourists, and in turn contribute 
to the economic growth. The ways to create Nation or Place Brands are numerous. Some 
examples are: Switzerland creates a brand as an expert of science, research and education to 
attract investments from China (Schlege, Jacot & Fetscherin, 2011); Humborg (2010) explores 
how countries can use Democracy as nation brand. 
  
However, there are some Nation or Place Brands that could be created unintentionally and 
naturally simply throughout the course of the historical development of a country or a place. One 
obvious example is a nation’s culture that has been developing throughout the history with 
multiple factors that are hard to pin point what they are – things were just evolved in their own 
ways. Brach (2010) discusses this type of nation brand with examples from Switzerland, Sweden, 
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Nigeria, and Poland.  Fan (2006) suggests that a nation can have a brand image without 
deliberating efforts of nation branding. This is an interesting and powerful insight – nation brand 
can be created naturally even though there was no effort to create one. 
 
In this paper, we are particularly interested in how the Colonial History of some countries have 
created unintended brands through the heritage (good or bad) of legal systems. It is not the 
purpose or scope of this paper to make a judgement on the Colonial History. Instead, we argue 
that the Colonial History and the related Legal systems can form an unintended nation brand 
which in turn can play an instrumental role of attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). 
 
We use the data from 193 countries and apply System Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) 
on a set of panel data. The findings support our hypothesis that Colonial History did form an 
unintended nation brand via legal systems and attracted FDI. .  
 
Our findings fill a gap in the nation brand literature that largely focus on the intended brand. We 
present evidence that unintended nation brand can be powerful to attract investments. This could, 
hopeful, stimulate further research in the field of unintended nation brand. Moreover, this is a 
first study looking at the impact of legal families on FDI. Our findings show a fresh line of 
enquiry on FDI determinants that have been researched extensively for some time. 
 
Whilst scholars agree that the concept of ‘similar economic behaviours’ is linked to countries of 
the ‘same legal-family groups’, Klerman et al. (2011) argue that La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 
2008)’s work on legal origins could not truly explain economic development. They claim that 
legal origins and colonial history are strongly correlated. It would be more appropriate to 
attribute the economic growth to other aspects of colonial policy. They re-classify the legal origin 
countries into five groups, namely, (1) former English colonies, (2) former French colonies, (3) 
former colonies of French Civil law countries other than France (for example, Belgium, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Ottoman Empire, and pre-communist Russia), (4) other former 
colonies and (5) countries never colonized. Their conceptual theory resides in the colonial history 
of the countries.  This paper intends to follow the new legal systems classification based on 
colonial history to investigate further whether the trends of FDI activities could be better 
explained than the previous legal familiar classification. 
 
As Kam (2011) shows that there are increasing proportions of global FDI from developed to 
developing economies. A logical question to ask is what are the factors that have motivated and 
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influenced the recent trend of FDI movements? Specifically, we aim to provide answers to the 
following questions: 
 
1. Does a country’s legal family (unintended nation brand) matter for attracting FDI inflows 
to the developing countries? 
2. Is applying the colonial powers theory proposed by Klerman et al. (2011) to classify legal 
families of countries providing a better explanation of the FDI movements than the 
previous classification? 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature and develops 
the theoretical framework of our study. Section 3 presents the classification of countries 
according to their legal family, colonial history, geographic and cultural factor. Section 4 
presents the data and empirical methodology. Section 5 discusses findings and analyses the 
results. The final section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
2. LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The effect of Nation Branding on FDI has been studied previously. For example, Kalamova & 
Konrad (2010) report that one index point increase on the Anholt Nation Brand Index can 
correspond to 27% increase of FDI, that is substantial. One important point emerging from the 
literature is that almost all of them focus on the ‘designed’ Nation Branding to attract FDI. In 
this paper, however, we are particularly interested in the effect of an Unintended Nation Brand 
in attracting FDI. Fan (2006) suggests that a nation can have a brand image without deliberating 
efforts of nation branding. This is an interesting and powerful insight. In a similar vein, Jaffe and 
Nebenzahl (2001) emphasise nation branding must embrace political, cultural, business and sport 
activities. These mean that a nation could have an unintended nation brand simply because of its 
historical political and culture rather than specially create one. Amongst all potential unintended 
nation brands, Klerman et al. (2011) ground breaking paper on Colonial History and Legal 
Origin prompt us to think that Legal systems could be a Nation Brand although it is not created 
by design. We are interested in the legal systems derived by the colonial history or in some 
countries no colonial history at all, and whether it can explain the trends of FDI observed.  
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2.1 Divergence of policies: during the Colonial era and the Post -colonial period 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) argue that European colonizers adopted different institutional 
policies for their administration. They emphasize that the economic development of the colonial 
countries depends largely on which institutions– ‘extractive’ or ‘protective’– the colonizers have 
established during the colonial era. During the colonial era, nearly all the colonizers established 
‘extractive’ institutions in their ex-colonies from which they intended to exploit resources for 
their own interest. Such extractive institutional policies were commonly adopted elsewhere, with 
a few exceptions where protective institutions (favourable policies) were established in some 
selected colonies where the colonizers sought to settle down. 
 
In the ex-colonies such as the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, while the colonizers 
merely wanted to exercise their ‘political powers’ to exploit the benefits from their colonies, 
there is no incentive for them to educate the inhabitants as well as improving their basic 
infrastructure. Under the absolute political power of the colonists, most of the ex-colonies were 
unable to develop effectively because they did not provide a positive business environment (lack 
of skilled workers and modern infrastructure as well as deficiencies in legal enforcement) to 
attract foreign investment. Hence, these countries have had low development since the 19th 
century and thus fell behind economically.  
 
In the post-colonial period, most of the former colonizers have shown an interest in providing 
aid and assistance to their ex-colonies. They have endeavoured to help the ex-colonies to protect 
human rights and fight against inequality, and to promote democratization and economic 
development as well as condemning racism and apartheid.  
 
It is reasonable to assume that, once a country able to provide a good educational human 
workforce; improved infrastructure and an effective legal system with enforcement to protect the 
investors’ intellectual property rights, this country will be able to attract foreign investment. 
Investors basically intend to find a place where they can produce their goods at lower production 
cost (cheap labour and land) and can maximise their sales in larger markets as well as accessing 
an abundant supply of resources, provided that their property assets and investments can be 
protected. Thus, when the governments of the ex-colonies can proceed with their institutional 
reform to satisfy these elements of location advantages, which previously they did not have, their 
economies will gradually grow. 
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2.2 Classification of Legal-families: English Common Law, French Civil Law 
The characteristics of legal culture have been basically defined as “ideas, values, expectations 
and attitudes towards law and legal institutions which some public or some part of public holds” 
((Friedman 1977 in Nelken, 1977 (ed)). More explicitly, some authors refer to ‘legal culture’ as 
a part of the country’s heritage synonymously with tradition (Ehrmann 1976). Conclusively, 
Merryman (1985:2) elaborates that a legal tradition is “deeply rooted in historically conditioned 
attitudes about the nature of law… the role of law in …operation of a legal system...It puts the 
legal system into cultural perspective”. Thus, a study of the legal system involves a number of 
legal traditions and sub-traditions providing an insight into the evolution of legal systems. 
 
At the beginning of the 20th Century, researchers started conducting a wide range of comparative 
studies on the concept of ‘families of law’. The study of comparative law was introduced aiming 
to underpin a unification of civilised legal systems. Glendon et al. (1992) point out that legal 
scholars agree that some national legal systems are sufficiently similar in certain critical respects 
and, therefore, could be classified into major families of law. However, there was no unanimity 
way on the ‘correct’ classification of legal families.  
 
In the recent decades, economists omit the former socialist legal system from their analysis base. 
Since then many writers (such as Glaser and Shleifer, 2002 and La Porta et al. 2008) 
identify the countries as coming from two main traditions: Common law and Civil law in which 
they include French, German, and Scandinavian law as sub-traditions. As such, the laws of most 
countries are heavily influenced by either ‘English Common Law’ or ‘French Civil Law’. 
 
 
2.3 Legal Origins Theory 
Over the last two decades, there has been a considerable body of research analysing the pervasive 
influence of a country’s legal system in relation to legal rules and economic outcomes. La Porta 
et al. (1997, 1998) investigate the origins of each country’s legal system, discussing its causal 
relationship with financial development and economic outcomes. They identify the countries as 
coming from two main traditions: English common law and French civil law in which La Porta 
et al. (1998) include German and Scandinavian law as sub-traditions. The legal system of 
common law countries originates from English law while the system of French, German and 
Scandinavian civil law countries originates from Roman law. 
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La Porta’s empirical works show that legal origins are highly correlated with the content of the 
law. Analyses were made by taking a set of key legal rules, primarily corporate and bankruptcy 
laws, into shareholder and creditor rights indices for each country. Furthermore, also some other 
measures of enforcement quality represented by ‘the efficiency of the judicial system’ and ‘the 
quality of accounting standards’ served as proxies for the stances of the law towards investor 
protection. The study examined the variation of legal rules and enforcement quality across 49 
representative countries chosen from Europe, North and South America, Africa, Asia, and 
Australia. The sample consisted of 18 English common law origin countries, 21 French civil law 
origin countries, 6 German law origin countries, and 4 Scandinavian countries. Empirical results 
show that legal families appear to shape legal rules and, in turn, influence financial markets and 
economic outcomes (La Porta et al. 1998, and 2000). Shareholders and creditors have greater 
protection in common law countries than in civil law countries. More explicitly, “common law 
countries protect both shareholders and creditors the most, French civil law countries the least, 
and German civil law and Scandinavian civil law countries somewhere in the middle” (La Porta 
et al. 1997:1132). Results also show that there is a weaker protection of property rights and 
investment from minority investor in civil law countries than is the case with English common 
law countries.  
 
2.4 Theory of Legal 'Colonial Powers' 
Following the legal origins theory from LLSV and others, Klerman et al. (2011) reclassify the 
legal families in order to explain more fully the institutional qualities that might be transplanted 
from the colonizers. They argue that LLSV’s work on legal origins could not truly explain 
economic growth. They argue that colonial policy matters, and they re-classify the legal origin 
countries into five groups.  
 
The theory of ‘Colonial powers’ stresses that institutional quality and judiciary influence are 
being left as colonial legacies which contribute as dominating factors to a country’s economic 
growth and development. This sounds reasonable because different institutional qualities would 
have become embedded in the specific cultural, political and economic conditions of the 
colonized countries, and that would have a substantial impact on their financial development and 
economic growth and thus on their FDI activities. The preceding discussion provides an 
explanation of the influential importance of legal qualities that have been transmitted to countries 
worldwide through occupation and colonization. Obviously, countries with legal qualities from 
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colonizers of the same ‘legal-family’ group would be sufficiently similar in certain critical 
respects, and FDI flows differ to countries on the basis of different legal-family groups.  
 
Conclusively, there has been a wide range of discussions relating FDI-growth to institution-
growth. Nevertheless, we consider all three (FDI, institution, and growth) as essential elements 
of our study. Such arrangement would be able to assess the effect of institutional qualities (in 
particular under legal origins and colonial powers concern) on economic growth and FDI 
activities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study which compares the 
influential importance of the pervasive legal origin theory originated from La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998, 2008) and the ‘colonial powers’ theory from Klerman et al. (2011) broadly across 193 
developed and developing countries. Our results support the claim that institutional quality is a 
likely determinant of FDI particularly for emerging countries such as the Caribbean. This may 
explain the recent trend of FDI movements. 
 
 
3. Classification of countries 
This paper intends to adopt a new classification method to investigate the recent trend of FDI 
activities. Since our paper aims to assess the trend of foreign direct investment under a ‘legal-
families’ consideration, we must clearly focus on how legal families might be appropriately 
classified. Our approach is to compare the FDI growth rate among the countries in different legal 
family-groups; we also need to classify the countries in the world by regions. That is, the 
countries are categorised according to both their legal families and their geographic/cultural 
situation. This would allow us to locate those countries which have faster growth as regards FDI 
inflows. 
 
3.1 Classification of countries into different legal families  
For this study, it is necessary to identify as many as possible the countries’ legal systems in terms 
of codification so that we can allocate them in the appropriate legal-family groups. We obtained 
the required data directly from Professor Daniel Klerman’s database1, which was used in his 
paper Klerman et. al. (2011), that was originally sourced the colonial power coding from the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online.  
 
                                                 
1 One of the authors contacted Professor Daniel Klerman asking if he could provide the coding from his database. 
Professor Klerman was so kind to provide not only the coding from himself but also the coding used by La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998, and 2008).  
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To verify the data, we also checked with other publications, such as  Zweigert & Kötz (1998), 
Roberts-Wray (1996), Campbell (2006), International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Law 
& Judicial Systems of Nations, Modern Legal Systems Cyclopaedia, and the World Legal 
Systems Website of the University of Ottawa2. Accordingly, we postulate a table with the coding 
of legal and colonial origins and thus putting 193 countries as well as several districts/cities3 in 
their corresponding legal families (see Table 1) and present it in the Appendix. 
 
The families in terms of ‘Legal origin’ are listed in the horizontal rows while the families under 
‘colonial powers’ are listed in the vertical columns, such that a clearer picture in comparing the 
coding for the countries in terms of legal origin and colonial powers is displayed4. This enables 
us to compare the explanatory power of these two classifying methods and estimate the relative 
importance of legal origin and colonial history.  
 
3.2 Regional classification 
In addition, classifying countries according to their legal families, we also group them in 
accordance with their geographic/cultural belonging. This would partly serve as a control 
purpose in our empirical tests and analysis so that we know whether the FDI trends were affected 
by legal families or simply the geographic/cultural belonging.  It will also help us to observe and 
understand why some countries stand out from the group (an integrated group in terms of legal 
families and geographical/regional classification) and to forecast the future destination of FDI 
inflows. 
 
As presented in Table 2, countries/districts5 are allocated in the different regions. The countries 
are categorised using criteria including (1) their physical geographic situation; (2) their human 
geographic6 involvement; (3) having sufficient countries in each of the regional groups so as to 
meet requirements for conducting the intended regression analysis. The arrangements adopted 
allow us to study the country-groups using a holistic approach. As a result, we can explore 
                                                 
2 The World Legal System Research Group, JuriGlobe, of University of Ottawa provides a wide range of legal 
data on its website: http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/ [Accessed on August 21, 2013]. 
3 We also include several districts/cities which are the regional cities or special administrations but are economical 
prosperous (for example, Scotland, Louisiana, Taiwan and Hong Kong) in our table for analysis. 
4 Details of our ‘legal families’ classification are available on request, or perhaps refer to the to the thesis of Kam, 
Oi (2015): Chapter 5 from p.106 to p.129 under the Link: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/32525.  
5There are 242 countries/districts classified into ten groups, in which 49 countries/districts are being opted out from 
our analytic base due to lack of available FDI data. Therefore, we have 193 countries/districts as our sample 
countries. 
6 The countries’ human activities relating to population, economic activities, political and agricultural systems 
would also been taken into consideration. For example, we put nearly the entire African groups in a single entity 
called ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ region. 
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theFDI activities in the countries of different legal-family groups within each of the regions, 
which have been specifically defined to make our regression analysis possible and reliable7.  
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1  DATA 
Our data for the FDI variables are collected from World development indicators by the World 
Bank for the period of 1970-2014 for 193 countries. This panel dataset over 193 countries is time 
averaged in such a way to observe FDI measure ( ) over nine ‘5-year sessions’. Specifically, 
the model is estimated over the periods from ‘1970-1974’ to ‘2010-2014’8. As such, each of the 
variables defined in Table 3 represents the average values of the variables over the preceding 
five years. The only exception being the legal origin dummy (both Legal origins and colonial 
powers) which assumes a value of 1 if the legal system is civil code law and 0 otherwise. 
 
We use a 5-year session period for analysis because we wish to gauge the forecasting horizon 
for the FDI measure as it is an unanticipated component extending about five years into the 
future. It means that when we lag once, the current series will have to start one session period 
after, i.e. at the ‘1975- 1980’ session and end at ‘2010–2014’. In addition, each unit of measure 
increases on the logarithmic scale, and, therefore, can cover a large range of scales.  
 
We posit that once the leaders of the regimes are able to provide good education, modernised 
infrastructure and a good legal system with enforcement to protect the investors’ property assets, 
other things being equal, these countries will be more able to attract foreign investment. Thus, 
we need the data to proxy legal-related institutions in addition to non-legal-related economic and 
financial measures.  
 
To measure legal-related institutional quality parameters, our study based on the three 
dimensions of institutional quality, we fetch the data of ‘Law and Order’ (Rule of Law) and 
‘Corruption’ to assess ‘security of property rights’ as one of the dimensions. In the face of such 
concerns, the rule of law (law and order) is the judiciary regulation that the government brings 
credibility to its commitments by delegating to court to secure the citizens’ personal safety and 
property assets. The latter is an essential element to gain FDI inflows as foreign investors need 
                                                 
7 Details of regional classification of the countries are available on request, or perhaps refer to the thesis of Kam, 
Oi (2015): Chapter 6 from p.134 to p.145 under the Link: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/32525. 
8 The nine ‘5-year sessions’ are: ‘1970-1974’, 1975-1979’, 1980-1984’, 1985-1989’, 1990-1994’, ‘1995-1999’, ‘2000-
2004’, ‘2005-2009’ and ‘2010-2014’. 
itFDI
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the protection of their knowledge-based assets as one the first priorities. We follow La Porta et 
al. (1998) and Staats and Biglaiser (2012) and use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
provided by the PRS Group9 to assess the strength of law and impartiality of the legal system in 
the countries worldwide, as a proxy for the rule of Law. To assess the corruption in the global 
countries, the data of the ‘Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of 2012 provided by ‘the 
Transparency International Corruption: the global coalition against corruption’ is used.  
 
The second institutional dimension is measured by the data of ‘Bureaucratic Quality’ and 
‘Government Stability’ sourced from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provided by 
the PRS Group (2012).  
 
As for the third-dimensional assessment, we use the new version Polity IV (2012) to assess the 
political issues of authoritarian-democracy situation of the states in the world system for 
comparative and quantitative analysis, but it is averaged over the five-year interval throughout 
the sample period.  
 
The three dimensional institutional qualities are the contributing factors to tell if a country has a 
stable economic environment and potential laws to secure the investors’ property assets. 
However, investors are concerned with the emergence of independent judges and impartial courts 
that could effectively apply the law in place for the protection of their knowledge-based assets, 
in particular. To account for legal enforcement, Staats and Biglaiser (2012) and Dogru (2012) 
use the ‘Judicial Independence’ dataset from the ‘Economic Freedom of the World (EWF)’ 
provided by the Fraser Institute as one of the independent variables for their empirical analyses. 
We follow them to obtain the data of ‘Judicial Independence’ as one of the instrumental 
variables. Since ‘Judicial Independence’ is regarded as enforcement of the law by independent 
judges at impartial courts, it is casually related to the institutional variables particularly ‘Rule of 
Law’. Therefore, we treat it as an instrumental variable in our ‘Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM)’ framework to account for the endogeneity problem10.  
 
                                                 
9 We use the ICRG dataset (T3B data) of 2012 which was released in March 2013 for analysis. 
10 It is due to the correlation between 'judiciary independence' and the institutional independent variables in 
particular 'rule of law'. To this end, Beck et al. (2000) use the legal origin of each country as an instrumental 
variable to extract the exogenous component of financial intermediary development. This achieved to address the 
unobserved cross-country effect and the problem of endogeneity.  
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We posit a framework to embrace both the theories of ‘legal origins’ and ‘colonial powers’ to 
explore their influential effect on the economic performance and FDI activities of the global 
countries. The data for Legal origins and colonial powers are obtained from Professor Daniel 
Klerman, who kindly sent us the coding from both his database and also from those of La Porta 
et al. (1997, 1998, and 2008). Accordingly, we produce a table with the coding of legal and 
colonial origins for putting 193 countries/districts in their corresponding legal families 
concerned. (See Table 1). 
 
We also employ non-legal proxies for other institutional, economic and financial measures which 
address the manner of legal and colonial origins to the trend of FDI movements. Our main non-
legal variables are ‘Human capital’, ‘Infrastructure’, ‘Trade openness’, ‘Wealth’, ‘M2/GDP’ and 
‘Inflation rate’ to capture the economic and financial impacts. These economic and financial data 
are obtained from the World Bank Statistics, except the data of Human Capital (proxied by the 
Average secondary schooling 15)11 which are sourced from Barro and Lees (2012).  
 
We also include ‘Trade Openness’ as one of the independent variables to explain FDI because 
when a country is open to trade and capital flows, it is more likely to develop its financial system. 
As such, ‘trade openness’ and ‘financial openness’ are, therefore, complementary to each other. 
 
As well, we choose ‘M2’ as the independent variable to assess financial factors involved in FDI 
measurement. It is commonly used to assess financial development because it is a comparatively 
less liquid monetary aggregate – M2/GDP. Wealth is chosen to measure the sum of natural, 
human and physical assets; In addition, the ‘inflation rate’ is chosen to gauge the impact of 
nominal interest rate minus the real interest rate.  
 
Conclusively, in order to explore the effect of legal origins on FDI activities, we will use ‘Legal 
origins’ (under Legal origins theory and Colonial powers theory) as the instrumental variables 
to account for the endogeneity problem, together with other instruments. These variables work 
as complementary instruments with the two legal-related variables that will produce consistent 
and efficient estimates to control the presence of the cross-country effect. Thus, a more reliable 
and convincing empirical result could be computed. The description of the variables is shown in 
Table 3 as in the appendix. 
                                                 
11 Barro and Lee (2012) illustrate that the number of students at the age of 15 who could still receive secondary 
education would more accurately measure  'human capital' because students at 15 would have attained completed and 
near to completed secondary school education, thereby be able to provide the potential source of skilled workers.  
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4.2 Methodology  
4.2.1 Model Specification  
While much of the previous literature has used cross -sectional analysis, we are using 
a panel data approach. By using a panel dataset, we can gain degrees of freedom by 
adding the variability of the time-series dimension, and more importantly, to control 
for the unobserved country specific effects. Moreover, a dynamic panel estimator can 
produce consistent and efficient estimates when the country-specific effects are 
correlated with the lagged independent variables.   
 
The model takes the general form, 
 
                                 (4.1) 
         =  +  
 
 The extended form of (4.1): 
   
             , 1 , 1 2 , ,i t i t i t i i tY BY X                              (4.2)            
  
where the composite error is  , ,i t i i t     and ,i t  represent countries and time 
periods respectively. 
i  and ,i t  are the idiosyncratic disturbances ,i tY is the dependent 
variable and ,i tX is the explanatory variables. Specifically, ,i tY is the logarithm of ‘FDI 
measure’ over a five year session period, , 1i tY   is the logarithm of ‘FDI measure’ at 
the start of that period, ,i tX represents the explanatory variables other than lagged 
‘FDI measure’, 
i   is the unobserved country-specific effect of country i  , ,i t are the 
observation-specific errors of country i at time period t .  
 
 
4.2.2 Endogeneity problem 
The presence of a lagged dependent variable as explanatory variables in the equation 
(4.1) and (4.2) means that the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator will yield 
biased coefficient estimates. It is because there are possible correlations between 
with the variables of lag and other explanatory variables. Therefore, it vio lets the 
assumption of MLR3 which should be strictly complied with. To this end, Hsiao 
(1986) shows that OLS estimates of the autoregressive parameter will be an upward 
bias in the presence of individual-specific effects. To overcome this problem, the 
GMM estimation method will be used to address the biases due to unobserved cross -
, 1 , 1 2 , ,i t i t i t i tY Y X    
,i t i ,i t
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country effect, the presence of lagged dependent variables, and the problem of 
endogeneity. (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003).  
 
4.2.3 The Generalised Method of Moments  
The general GMM estimation principle is based on a set of  population moment 
conditions, also called orthogonality conditions. A GMM estimator can then be 
obtained by solving the sample equivalent of these orthogonality conditions, to 
identify the parameters of interest. Let us now formalise this general estimation 
principle in a panel data framework, by using the general notation introduced in 
equation (4.1). 
Let us rewrite equation (4.1) in the following way 
 
         ;                        (4.3) 
 
Where: 1 ,i iX  represents the institutional variables such as Corruption, Rule of law, 
Bureaucratic Quality, Government Stability, and Polity IV; 2 ,i tX is a set of 
contemporaneous (and lagged) explanatory variables such as Infrastructure, Trade 
openness, Wealth, M2, and Inflation rate. Therefore, there are possible correlations 
between ,i t with the explanatory variables , 1i tY   (that is . 1i tFDI  ) and 1 ,i iX , resulting in 
biased coefficient estimates if OLS is used as an estimation technique.  
 
Fundamentally, some of the regressors are endogenous so tha t '1, ,t( ) 0t iE X       
(Institutions and lagged FDI). So, the 
1K   regressors 1X are potentially endogenous, and 
the remaining 
1( )K K  regressors 2X   are assumed to be exogenous. Also, iZ   is  n  x 
L  vector, which is the full set of instrumental variables that are assumed to be 
exogenous, i.e. ( ) 0i iE Z   . We partition the instruments [ 1 2Z Z ], where the 1L   
instruments 
1Z  are excluded instruments, and the remaining ( 1L L ) instruments 
2 2Z X  are the included instruments as well as exogenous regressors.  
 
                 The moment estimation principle rests on the assumption that the instruments, satisfy 
the conditional moment restrictions ,E[Z ] 0i i t  . The GMM estimator based on these 
moment conditions minimizes the following quadratic form, where the population 
moments have been replaced with their sample counterparts:  
, 0 1 , 1 2 1 , 3 2 , ,i t i t i t i t i tY Y X X        
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𝑀𝑖𝑛𝜃 [
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑍𝑖𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 ]
′
𝑊𝑁 [
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑍𝑖𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 ] ;                 (4.4) 
 
Where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝜇𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑋1𝑖𝑡−𝛽3𝑋2𝑖𝑡 and 𝑊𝑁  is a positive definite 
weighting matrix. A White type robust estimate of the weighting matrix allows to 
consider both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation over time, see Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005:746). An efficient GMM estimator is obtained by replacing 𝑊𝑁 with 
𝑆−1 =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑍𝑖
′𝜇𝑖?̂?𝜇𝑖?̂?
′𝑍𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  
 
4.24  Testing the validity of instruments 
While the System GMM approach allows us to obtain consistent and efficient 
estimators, the validity of the instruments plays an important role to achieve these 
properties. Newey and Smith (2004) find that the general GMM estimator suffers 
from quite large finite sample biases. While the one-step GMM estimator uses weight 
matrices of independent estimated parameters, the efficient two -step GMM estimator 
weights the moment conditions by a consistent estimate of their covariance matrix 
and it would be best suited for System GMM estimation model (Windmieger, 2006).  
 
After computing the GMM estimates, we would use the Hansen test to identify for 
over-identification to assess whether the instruments used are not correlated with the 
residuals under the null hypothesis. As discussed earlie r, when the number of 
instruments   is larger than the number of parameters  the model is over-identified 
under the null of joint validity, the vector of empirical moments  12 is randomly 
distributed around zero. Noticeably, the Hansen test for over-identification is the way 
to make feasible by substituting a consistent estimate of the minimized value of a 
feasible GMM estimator. Conclusively, our System GMM estimation is to drive the 
vector of empirical moments  close to zero, and then we test if it is close to 
zero.  
                                                 
12 is the estimate of the vector of  residuals for individual  
L K
1 ˆ
N
Z E
1 ˆ
N
Z E
Eˆ i
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Furthermore, we apply a Wald test13 to test for the joint null-hypothesis that the coefficient on 
all additional variables are zero. If it does, the statistics are the chi-squared value ( ) distributed 
with degrees of freedom. Based on the p-value, we are able to reject the null hypothesis, 
indicating that these variables create a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the 
 
5.  Results and Analysis 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix between foreign direct investment  and legal 
influence and economic performance in our sampled countries, which are classified 
of different legal families according to the theory of ‘legal origins’ or ‘colonial 
powers’. From this table, it shows a h igh correlation (52% highlighted in bold and 
underlined) between ‘French legal origin’ and ‘FDI inflows in Latin America and the 
Caribbean’. While looking at the French related legal -families under ‘colonial 
powers’ classification, there is as much as 86% correlation (highlighted in bold and 
underlined) between ‘Spanish French origin’ and ‘FDI inflows in Latin America and 
the Caribbean’, leaving the rest of the French legal entities relatively insignificant, 
particularly the ‘Former French’ which shows a negatively insignificant figure of -
12% (highlighted in bold and underlined). This initial analysis indicates that in 
general ‘colonial powers variable’ would be capable of showing the real situation of 
FDI activities. 
 
We present the GMM estimation for assessing the influential importance of legal 
qualities in different legal-family groups and studying the trend of FDI movements. 
We would like to undertake two parts of regression analysis. Firstly, we treat ‘Legal 
Origins’ and ‘Colonial Powers’ as independent variables. Each of them is put together 
with other independent variables such as the economic, finance, and institutions so 
that we can assess its effect as well as the joint significance of these instrumental 
variables on FDI activities in the global countries of different legal families and 
regions.  
 
We name the first part of empirical analysis the ‘Group A’ and the second part the 
‘Group B’.  We study four legal traditions (under Legal Origins theory)  and twelve 
                                                 
13 We follow 'the Institute for Digital Research and Education' which provides clear explanation on the application 
of Wald test in STATA. See http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/fag/nested_tests.htm 
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selected legal-family groups (under Colonial Powers theory) in 10 regions14 as to 
compare the levels of FDI movements in these family-groups under ‘Legal Origins’ 
and ‘Colonial powers’ classification.  
 
In Group A, the first set of tables, Tables 5 and 6, the estimation results on the levels 
of FDI inflows to countries of various legal family-groups across 10 regions are 
presented. Table 5 shows the levels of FDI inflows in the countries mainly classified 
into four main family groups according to La Porta et al.’s (1997, 1998, and 2008) 
classifying method; they are British legal origins, French legal origins and the 
German legal origins as well as Scandinavian legal origins as sub -tradition. Table 6 
presents the levels of FDI inflows to the countries classified in twelve legal family-
groups according to Klerman et al. (2011)’s classifying method.  
 
A similar pattern in terms of legal-family groups and regional classification can be 
recognised for another set of tables, Tables 7 and 8. However, they assess the levels 
of FDI inflows as a percentage of real GDP according to the classification mode of 
‘Legal Origins theory’ and ‘Colonial Powers theory’ respectively. This set of tables 
would show how important FDI would contribute to the countries’ economies under 
legal quality concern and would act as a complement to explain the results of Tables 
5 and 6.  
 
We begin with a general assessment of the value of , in the first set of tables in 
Group A; both Tables 5 and 6 show positive results of   in nearly all legal-family 
groups at 1% significance level. These results indicate that past FDI values have  a 
significant influence on current FDI activities. Similar significant results in most of 
the regions are seen in the second set of Table 7 and 8; the results indicate that foreign 
direct investment is important for the country’s GDP growth. This  would illustrate 
that a stronger FDI inflows will provide additional capital to boost the country's 
economy.  
  
Coming back to the comparative study of the levels of FDI inflows, in Table 5, when 
legal families are classified into four main groups for analysis under La Porta et al.’s 
classification mode, it is noted that most of the estimation results are generally not 
                                                 
14 One more legal family known as ‘Latin America only with the Caribbean’ is included in the Tables 5 and 7 in 
order to detect the FDI activities in the countries mainly in South America only. 
1FDI
1FDI
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statistically significant; however, French Civil Law origins in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (presented in Column B2) is positive at the 5% significance level [0.46**] 
inferring that there are substantial FDI inflows to the region. Under the term ‘French 
Civil law origins’, for the countries in Latin Amer ica and the Caribbean, it should 
generally refer to all those countries and territories in the Americas where Romance 
language is spoken. It, therefore, covers all the Spanish -, French-, and Portuguese-
speaking countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 15. As such, the results in Table 
5 serve to present a wider view on FDI moving to all French-speaking countries in 
the region, which is, including the Spanish, French, Portuguese, and Dutch colonies.  
      
In short, the findings are just singling out that those countries of ‘French civil origins’ 
in Latin America and the Caribbean are experiencing substantial FDI inflows. This 
would support that Latin America and the Caribbean have the greatest growth of FDI 
inflows at the remarkable increasing rate. The findings are in line with UNCTAD-
World Investment Statistics (2009-2014) which reported that FDI activities have been 
increasingly and consistently flowing to developing countries particularly Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  
 
Table 6 is designed to assess the levels of FDI inflows in countries classified into 
more legal-families according to Klerman et al. (2011)’s classification mode. In 
Table 6, clearly most of the regression results are generally not statistically 
significant with several exceptions. Similar to Table 5, in Table 6, positive and 
significant results are seen in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean no matter 
whether it is categorised to embrace all the countries of ‘Spanish colony’ [11.21** 
in column B (3)] at 5 percent level of significance or those ‘Spanish colonies without 
the Caribbean involved [8.95*** in column B (9)] at 1 percent level of significance. 
Indeed, they show that FDI is specifically moving to the countries of ‘Spanish colony’ 
which is further classified from French civil law origins as it was in Table 5.  
 
To explain further, in Table 5, the Roman speaking countries are categorised in a 
group of a single entity in the name of the French civil law origins; while, in Table 
                                                 
15 There are totally 50 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean listed in our compiled table 2; and there are 
40 countries with available data for analysis. In which 16 of them are ex-colonies/colonies of Spain mainly in the 
South America continent; 9 of them are ex-colonies/colonies of Britain mainly in the Caribbean called British 
west indices. Other ex-colonies/colonies belong to France, Portuguese and the Brazilian Empire, Netherlands, and 
the U.S. 
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6, the Roman speaking countries are further classified into more legal -family groups 
under ‘colonial powers’ concern. They are ‘Former French’, ‘Spanish colony’, 
‘Portuguese colony’, and ‘Dutch colony’. As such, the estimation results from Table 
6 show evidence that FDI is merely significantly flowing to the countries of Spanish 
colony but not the whole French civil law countries under a single entity.  
 
In Table 6, significant and positive results at 5% level of significance are also seen 
in the regions of ‘Eastern Asian and South -Eastern Asia’ [10.12** in column C(12)] 
and ‘Post-Soviet States’ [15.49** in column F(12)]. By referring to Table 1 and Table 
2, we can find out China is a country in the region of ‘Eastern Asian and South -
Eastern Asia’ which is categorised in the legal group under ‘Others’. It has been one 
of the destinations of foreign investment as it could protect the investors' property 
assets to a certain extent16. Similarly, in Table 1, we can find a list of countries that 
were the former Soviet Union. Most of these countries have been keen to adopt 
favourable institutions so that they can attract foreign investment. Besides, less 
positive and significant result [4.24** in column G(1)] at 5% confidence level is seen 
in North Atlantic Ocean, which is the region we postulate to include the developed 
countries on both sides across the Atlantic Ocean for regression analysis 17. The result 
may indicate that the developed countries in this region (such as the United States) 
are still the hot destinations of FDI, but the level of inflows is on the reducing trend 18 
in comparison with the emerging countries, for example, in Latin America.  
   
In Group B, Table 7 and 8 are the complementary set of tables we use to assess the 
levels of FDI inflows as a percentage of real GDP to further explain the impact of 
legal quality on FDI activities in relation to the countries’ economies. In Table 7, the 
regression results are not statistically significant in the classified four legal families. 
A comparative study in Table 8 shows that there are negative and statistically 
significant results at 5% confidence level 19 in assessing the level of FDI in relation 
                                                 
16   After the implementation of 'open door policy', in 1987, China established the general principles of civil law. There 
have been 130 laws approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC).  
17   Most of the countries in the Americas are grouped under 'Latin America and the Caribbean', leaving 5 countries -Bermuda, 
the US, Greenland and 'Saint Pierre and Miquelon'  in the district.  With only 5 countries, it is unable to provide sufficient 
observation for empirical tests. Therefore we combine them across the Atlantic with the countries in Northern Europe 
forming a cross-continental group.     
18  Here the 'reducing trend' is measured in terms of percentage. That is, it is not quantified by measurement of the actual 
figures of inward FDI, but by comparison of the percentage of increase of FDI inflows among the countries in the 
preceding year. 
19   Confidence level:  *** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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to real GDP growth in the regions of ‘Eastern and South -east Asia’ [-26.70** in 
column C (5)] and [-6.17** in column C (1)]. The results may suggest that FDI is 
dominant in these regions, but it contributes relatively less or in reducing rate to the 
real GDP growth of the economies.  
 
As far as the countries of ‘German never colonised’ in ‘Eastern and South -East Asia’ 
[-26.70** in column C(5)] are concerned, the countries of components in the region 
could be narrowed down to one country 20 , which is Japan. Reasonably, Japan is 
expected to follow the same track as it is in the U.S. and other developed countries 
that FDI provides relatively less in the proportion of GDP contribution. 
 
The same is true for analysing the countries of ‘former Engl ish’ in ‘Eastern and 
South-East Asia’ [-6.17** in column C(1)]. The representing countries, by referring 
to Table 1 and Table 2, are Hong Kong, Singapore, and India. They are also on the 
same track, as it is in the United States, to become the sources of providing global 
FDI and provide relatively less in the proportion of GDP contribution. Perhaps they 
are now becoming the essential financial and re-entry ports such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore.  
 
Table 8 also shows positive and significant results at 1% confidence level in the 
region of Latin America and the Caribbean [2.06*** in column B(3)], and 5% 
confidence level of significance in the regions of Latin America only [5.62** in 
column B(9)], Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia [19.12** in column C(12)] and 
Post-Soviet States21 [1.40** in column F(12)]. The results indicate that FDI has  a 
substantial contribution to the GDP growth of economies in these regions. By 
referring to Table 1, we can find out those countries that enjoy GDP growth via FDI 
enhancement. Notably, they are China, the Russian Federation, and the Latin 
American countries.  
Indeed, the regression results in both Group A and Group B suggest that ‘Legal 
qualities’, e.g., legal origins and judiciary independence,  has a substantial impact on 
‘FDI measures’ no matter whether it is classified under ‘Legal Origins theory’ or 
                                                 
20   Firstly we refer to Table 2 in the Appendix, from which we can find out a list of countries which belong to the classified 
region of ‘Eastern and South-Eastern Asia’ . Then we refer to Table 1 from which we can single out that Japan is the 
country we need to analyse. 
21   In Table 1, we put some countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as one of the legal family group as they 
are mostly the Post-Soviet States. 
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‘Colonial Powers theory’. The findings suggest that ‘Colonial powers’ and ‘Legal 
Origins’ matters about FDI activities. The results also illustrate that legal families 
while classified into sub-divided groups under ‘Colonial Powers theory’ would more 
truly reflect the real situation of FDI activities. The findings also demonstrate that 
the legal-families grouping under colonial powers theory explains better the trend of 
FDI than under legal origin theory.  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Our findings confirm that the current trend of FDI is moving to the countries that were 
economically behind such as Latin America and the Caribbean. This finding is in line with 
UNCTAD statistics (2009-2014) which reported that FDI activities have been consistently and 
increasingly flowing to developing countries, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Indeed, nearly all the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean were colonies/ex-colonies.  
 
The results are the outcome of regression on the data that proxy legal-related institutions and 
non-legal-related institutions such as Human Capital, Trade Openness, Wealth, M2/GDP, 
Infrastructure, etc., that are the necessary components of Band equity being translated into 
customer preference, loyalty, and financial gains. The strong results of FDI flowing to Latin 
America and the Caribbean underpin that the countries in this region have huge enhancement of 
country position in the global market place, reflecting their stronger position than before in 
providing favourable environment, such as the size of domestic market, access to regional trade 
areas, education of the population for more skilful workers, good infrastructure for better 
communication and transportation, and favourable business environment to protect the investors’ 
property rights, signifying nation banding address the image and message to further a country’s 
political, social and economic gains and create competitive advantage (Fan, 2005:10). 
 
As such, while our regression results support that FDI has been continuously flowing to Latin 
America and the Caribbean signify that ‘Brand differentiates products’ identifying countries on 
the strengths of the size of the domestic market, access to regional trade areas, for which  the  
divergence of policies during the Colonial era and the Post-colonial period matter because the 
poorer countries would develop faster under the Catch-up Theories of productivity.  
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Based on this theory, “it is easier for a country to grow fast if it starts out relatively poor”. Where 
workers experience a lack of capital (tools) for production, “small amounts of capital investment 
would substantially raise these workers’ productivity. By contrast, workers in rich countries 
have large amounts of capital with which to work…[an] additional investment has a relatively 
small effect on productivity” (Mankiw, 2012: 541-542). So, poorer countries could have faster 
growth if they are able to attract foreign investment. That is what we call the catch-up effect.  
To this end, we would like to make a subsequent research on the influence of such effect on FDI 
activities. 
 
Besides, our results support legal scholars claim that national legal systems are sufficiently 
similar in certain critical respects and, therefore, could be classified into major families of law. 
Our results support this argument as FDI is noted moving to some particular legal family groups. 
To this end, results from Tables 6 and 8 designed to further classify legal families into more 
groups, can reflect more truly the FDI moving trend. In fact, Latin America and the Caribbean 
are the regions where various colonialism is seen. 
 
Our findings would also have illustrated the impacts of legal and colonial history on foreign 
investment movements. It supports the theory of ‘Colonial powers’ which stresses that 
institutional quality and judiciary influence are being left as colonial legacies that contribute as 
dominating factors to a country’s economic growth and development. Reasonably, different 
institutional qualities would have become embedded in the specific cultural, political and 
economic conditions of the colonized countries, and that would have a substantial impact on 
their financial development and economic growth and thus on their FDI activities. It also 
underscores that effect of the ‘unintended’ Nation Branding due to Colonial History (CH) and 
Legal Origin (LO) that can explain Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in both developing and 
developed countries. 
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Appendix 
 
 Table 1: Classification of countries by Legal and Colonial Origins (Total countries= 193 countries/regions) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Former French Colony  Former British Colony Former Colony of Other French Civil Law Country Other Former Colony Never colonized  No of 
count 
(1) 
 
French 
Civil Law 
Legal Origin 
Algeria 
Andorra 
Belgium 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cambodia 
Cameroon  
Cote D’Ivoire 
Congo 
Central Africa Rep. 
Chad 
Comoro Island 
Djibouti 
French Guiana 
French Polynes 
Gabon 
Guinea 
Haiti 
Italy 
Laos, People’s Dem 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Martinique 
Mayotte 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Netherlands 
Niger 
Reunion 
Senegal 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Vietnam 
Somalia  
 
 
                           
Portuguese colony                         Belgian colony                        
Angola                                             Burundi 
 Brazil                                              Rwanda 
 Cape Verde                                     Dem Rep of Congo               
 Guinea-Bissau                                                    
 (Macao)                                           
 Mozambique                                    
 Sao tome and Prim                                              
 Timor-leste                                                                                           
                                                         Dutch colony                    
                                                         Aruba 
                                                         Indonesia   
                                                         Suriname 
                                                         Luxemburg 
 
Spanish colony                                Ottoman colony 
 Argentina                                         Albania 
 Bolivia                                             Armenia 
 Chile                                                Egypt 
 Columbia                                         Eritrea 
 Costa Rica                                       Greece                     
 Cuba                                                Lebanon   
 Dominican Rep.                              Libya 
 Ecuador                                           Jordan 
 El Salvador                                      Iraq 
 Equatorial Guinea                           Syria 
 Guatemala                                       Bulgaria                                  
 Honduras                                         Israel    
 Mexico                                            Oman 
 Panama 
 Paraguay 
 Peru               
 Uruguay 
 Venezuela 
 Nicaragua 
 
 
 
Afghanistan 
Ethiopia 
France 
Iran 
Kuwait 
Portugal 
Russian 
Federation 
Spain 
Turkey 
 
90 
(2) 
 
British 
Common 
Law legal 
origin 
 Antigua and Barbuda 
Australia                               
Bahamas, the                
Bangladesh    
Barbados                        
Belize                         
 
 
Australian colony 
Papua New Guinea 
Bhutan 
Liberia 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab Emir 
 45 
†
†
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Bermuda                         
Canada  
[Quebec (Canada)]                         
Fuji                                                             
Gambia                          
Ghana  
Grenada 
(Hong Kong) 
India  
Ireland 
Jamaica  
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Myanmar (Burma) 
Malawi  
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Solomon Island 
St. Vincent Anti 
Sudan 
Swaziland   
Tokelau                                                                           
Trinidad And Tobago 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
United States 
[Louisiana (USA)]   
Zambia 
St. Kitts-Nevis 
Swaziland 
United Kingdom 
[Scotland (UK)]  
(3) 
 
German 
Legal Origin 
   Japanese colony 
(Taiwan) 
Korea, Rep. 
 
Austro-Hungarian 
Croatia 
Czech Rep. 
Czechoslovakia 
Hungary 
Liechtenstein 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Bosnia and Herzog 
Romania  
Japan 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Germany 
  15 
†
†
†
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Serbia and Montenegro 
(4) 
 
Scandinavian 
Legal Origin  
   Danish Colony 
Iceland 
Swedish Colony 
Finland  
Norway 
Denmark 
Sweden 
  5 
(5) 
 
Others      Former Soviet 
Union/Russian Empire 
Russian Federation  
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lithuania  
Moldova 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan   
Belarus 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Poland 
 
Yugoslavia colony 
Kosovo  
Macedonia 
 
Former Chinese colony 
Mongolia 
China 
 
19 
 (6) 
 
Mixed Legal 
Origin 
Bahrain 
 
Botswana 
Cyprus 
Guyana 
Lesotho  
Malta 
Mauritius 
Qatar 
Seychelles 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
St. Lucia 
Vanuatu  
Zimbabwe 
Yemen, Rep 
 
 
U.S. colony 
Puerto Rica 
Philippines 
 
South African colony 
Namibia 
 
 
 
Thailand   19 
 
Total countries 
193 
 
Source: Compiled by authors according to the integrated data provided by Professor Daniel Klerman, the co-author of Klerman et al. (2011)  
( )  Hong Kong and Macau are now the Special Administrative Regions of China. Taiwan is regarded as part of China under UN classification.  They are put in brackets. 
  Scotland, Louisiana, Quebec, Cameroon, and Somalia are regarded as ‘regional hybrid’ marked with † †
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Table 2: Geographical region and composition (compiled by author) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
(Eastern Africa + 
Middle Africa + 
Southern Africa + 
Western Africa ) 
 
Total: 
countries/districts 
= 51-3 (no FDI  
data - marked with *) 
= 48 
Burundi Comoros Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar Malawi 
Mauritius Mayotte* Mozambique Réunion* Rwanda Seychelles Somalia South 
Sudan* 
Uganda United 
Republic of 
Tanzania 
Zambia Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Gabon Sao Tome 
and Principe 
South 
Africa 
Swaziland Angola Cameron Central 
African 
Republic 
Chad  Congo Botswana Lesotho 
Namibia Benin Burkina Faso Cape Verde Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Gambia Ghana Guinea 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Liberia Zimbabwe Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Saint 
Helena* 
Senegal Sierra Leone Swaziland      
 
Americas 
(Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean) 
 
 
Total: 
countries/districts 
= 50-10 (no FDI  
data - marked with *) 
 =40 
Caribbean 
Anguilla* Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Aruba 
 
Bahamas Barbados Bonaire, 
Saint 
Eustatius* 
Turks and 
Caicos 
Islands 
United 
States 
Virgin 
Islands* 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
British Virgin 
Islands 
Cayman 
Islands 
Cuba Curacao Dominica Dominican 
Republic 
 
Grenada 
Guadeloup
e* 
Haiti  Jamaica Martinique Montserrat* Puerto Rico Saint-
Barthélemy
* 
Saint Kitts 
and Nevis 
Saint Lucia Saint Martin 
(French part)* 
Saint Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
Sint 
Maarten 
(Dutch 
part)* 
    
Central America 
Belize Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama 
South America 
Argentina Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 
Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Falkland 
Islands 
(Malvinas)* 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic 
of) 
 French 
Guiana* 
 
Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay   
 
Asia  
Eastern Asia and 
South-Eastern 
Asia 
Total: 
countries/districts 
=18 -2 (SAR of 
China ) 
– 1 (no FDI data- 
marked with *) 
= 15 
China China, Hong 
Kong Special 
Administrativ
e Region  
China, Macao 
Special 
Administrativ
e Region  
Brunei 
Darussala
m 
Cambodia Indonesia Lao 
People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
Malaysia 
Myanmar Democratic 
People's 
Republic of 
Korea 
 
Japan Mongolia Republic of 
Korea 
Philippines  Singapore Thailand 
Timor-
Leste* 
Viet Nam       
Southern Asia 
Total: 
countries/districts 
= 9 
Afghanista
n    
Bangladesh Bhutan India Iran 
(Islamic 
Republic of) 
Maldives Nepal Pakistan 
Sri Lanka        
Mediterranean 
(Western Asia   
and North Africa) 
Armenia 
 
Azerbaijan Bahrain Cyprus Georgia Iraq Israel Jordan 
Kuwait Algeria Egypt 
 
Libya Morocco Tunisia Western 
Sahara* 
Sudan 
†
† †
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Total: 
countries/districts 
= 25 -1 (no FDI  
data - marked with *)  
=24 
 
Lebanon Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
State of 
Palestine 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Turkey United 
Arab 
Emirates 
Yemen 
 
       
Post-Soviet 
States 
(Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia) 
Total: 
countries/districts 
= 15  
Belarus Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
 
Hungary Poland Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan 
Republic of 
Moldova 
Romania Russian 
Federation 
Slovakia Ukraine Turkmenista
n 
Uzbekistan  
 
Europe 
North Atlantic 
Ocean 
(Northern Europe  
and Northern 
America) 
Total: 
countries/districts 
= 22 -9 (no FDI  
data - marked with *) 
=13  
Bermuda Canada Greenland Åland 
Islands* 
Channel 
Islands* 
 
Denmark Estonia 
 
Faeroe 
Islands* 
Finland Guernsey* Iceland Ireland Saint Pierre 
and 
Miquelon* 
United 
States of 
America 
 
Jersey* Sark* 
Svalbard 
and Jan 
Mayen 
Islands* 
Sweden United 
Kingdom of 
Great Britain 
and Northern 
Ireland 
Latvia Lithuania* Norway   
Southern Europe 
Total: 
countries/districts 
= 16 - 4 (no FDI  
data - marked with *) 
= 12 
Albania Andorra* Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Croatia Gibraltar Greece Holy See* Italy 
Malta Montenegro Portugal San 
Marino* 
Serbia Slovenia Spain 
 
The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia
* 
Western Europe 
Total: 
countries/districts 
= 9 – 1 (no FDI  
data - marked with *) 
= 8 
Austria Belgium France Germany Liechtenstei
n 
 
 
Luxembourg 
 
Monaco* Netherlands 
Switzerland        
 
Oceania 
 
Total: 
countries/districts 
= 25 – 16  (no FDI  
data - marked with *) 
= 9 
 
Australia and New Zealand 
Australia New Zealand Norfolk Island      
Melanesia 
Fiji New 
Caledonia* 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Solomon 
Islands* 
Vanuatu*    
Micronesia 
Guam* Kiribati Marshall 
Islands 
Micronesia 
(Federated 
States of)* 
Nauru* Northern 
Mariana 
Islands* 
Palau*  
Polynesia 
American 
Samoa* 
Cook Islands* French 
Polynesia 
Niue* Pitcairn* Samoa* Tokelau* Tonga* 
Tuvalu* Wallis and 
Futuna 
Islands* 
      
Grand total  =48+40+15+9+24+15+13+12+8+9 =193 countries/districts 
 
Compiled by author-sourced from:- 
United Nations Statistics Division (UNdata)  
Note: The countries/district marked with asterisk* are being opted out from our analysis sample due to lack of available FDI data for these 
countries 
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                       Table 3: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
FDI Measure 
FDI inflow  Inflows of FDI (US$) 
 
World Bank Statistics 
FDI Inflow/GDP           Inflows of FDI (US$)/GDP 
 
World Bank Statistics 
FDI Net Net value of FDI (US$) 
 
World Bank Statistics 
FDI Net/ GDP Net value of FDI (US$)/GDP 
 
World Bank Statistics 
Institutions 
 
ICRG rule of law 
(Law and order) 
Index of intellectual Property 
Rights Protection *Law and order 
(assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of legal system) 
 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) – 
The PRS Group (2012) 
Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) 
An assessment of corruption within 
the political system that distorts the 
economic and financial 
environment, reduces the 
efficiency 
 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) – 
The PRS Group (2012) 
Bureaucracy Quality An assessment of possible drastic 
policy changes when governments 
change. Strong bureaucracy has the 
strength and expertise to govern 
without drastic changes in policy 
or interruptions in government 
services 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) – 
The PRS Group (2012) 
Government Stability An assessment of the government’s 
ability to carry out its declared 
program(s) and its ability to stay in 
office based on criteria like 
government unity, legislative 
strength 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) – 
The PRS Group (2012) 
Polity IV Measures key qualities in 
executive recruitment, 
constraints on executives, and 
political competition. It gives an 
indication of whether a regime 
is an institutionalised 
democracy or institutionalised 
autocracy or anocracies (mixed, 
or incoherent, authority regimes) 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2012) 
 
Legal Origins Classification of Legal families 
under the theory of LLSV (1997, 
1998, 2008) 
CIA Fact Book 
Colonial Powers Classification of Legal families 
under Klerman’s (2011) colonial 
powers theory  
Coding compiled by 
author according to the 
integrated data 
provided by Professor 
Daniel Klerman  
Judiciary Independence  Proxy for enforcement of law 
through independent judges and 
impartial courts  
'Economic Freedom of 
the World (EWF)' 
provided by the Fraser 
Institute 
Human Capital 
(Average Secondary School 15) 
Proxy for Human Capital Barro and Lees 
(1994) 
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Infrastructure  
(Fixed Line Telephones) 
Telephone lines (per 100 people): 
Proxy for the state of infrastructure 
in a country 
 
World Bank Statistics 
Trade Openness  Measured by the ratio of the sum 
of exports and imports to GDP 
  
World Bank Statistics 
Wealth  
(Measured by real GDP per Capita) 
A monetary measure which 
includes the sum of natural, human 
and physical assets. 
 
World Bank Statistics 
M2/ GDP Money and quasi-money (M2) as 
% of GDP 
 
World Bank Statistics 
Inflation rate Nominal Interest rate minus the 
real interest rate 
 
World Bank Statistics 
‘Mortality Settlers’ Mortality Data which measures 
Deaths by Broad Age group:  both 
sex 
 
United Nations 
Statistics (World 
Population Prospects) 
Indices of Fractionalization Measurement of religion, ethnicity, 
and language  
 
Journal of Economic 
Growth. 
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Table 4 : the correlation between foreign direct investment in the legal-families under Legal Origins and Colonial Powers Classification  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FDI inflows 
   (1) FDI Inflows     (2) FDI Net     (3) Latin America and the Caribbean    (4) Middle East     (5) South Asia         (6) Sub-Sahara  
  (7) Transition economy                (8) British Common Law   (9) French Civil Law   (10) Former French    (11) Portuguese Colony 
(12) Spanish French                      (13) Dutch Colony              (14) Mixed-English        (15) Judiciary independence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
FDI 
Measure 
FDI 
Inflow 
1               
FDI Net 
0.39 1              
FDI  
Inflows 
(Latin 
America) 
-0.02 0.00 1             
FDI  
Inflows 
(Middle East) 
-0.14 0.89 -0.19 1            
FDI 
Inflows 
(South 
Asia) 
-0.02 0.29 -0.02 -0.07 1           
FDI 
Inflows 
(Sub 
Sahara) 
-0.29 
-0.29 
 
-0.24 -0.1 -0.09 1          
FDI 
Inflows 
Transition 
economy 
0.11 0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 1         
Legal 
Families 
(under Legal 
Origins 
classification) 
British 
Common 
Law 
-0.22 -0.28 -0.41 -0.24 0.16 0.44 -0.11 1        
French  
Civil Law 
0.02 0.07 0.52 0.28 -0.11 -0.26 0.13 -0.70 1       
Legal 
Families 
(under 
Colonial 
Powers 
classification) 
Former 
French 
0.13 0.08 -0.12 0.31 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.15 0.15 1      
Portuguese 
Colony 
0.19 0.24 0.28 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 0.18 -0.03 1     
Spanish 
French 
-0.06 0.01 0.86 -0.18 0.02 -0.2 -0.07 -0.47 0.56 -0.10 -0.09 1    
Dutch 
Colony 
N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 1   
Mixed-
English 
-0.10 -0.12 -0.16 -0.07 -0.06 0.37 -0.03 0.30 -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.14 N.A 1  
Judiciary independence 0.27 0.16 -0.26 0.07 -0.06 0.09 -0.11 0.38 -0.40 0.05 0.17 -0.52 N.A 0.17 1 
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(Group A) 
Table 5: System GMM regression of levels of FDI Inflows to countries by regions classified by Legal Origins theory   
FDI 
Legal Origins 
A= Sub-Sahara;              B=Latin America and the Caribbean;                 b= Latin America only without the Caribbean;          C=Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia;      
D=Southern Asia;           E=Mediterranean (Western Asia + North Africa);     F= Post-Soviet States (Eastern Europe + Central Asia);      G= North Atlantic Ocean (Northern America + Southern Europe);              
H= Southern Europe;     J=Western Europe;                                              K= Oceania;                                                    
1=English legal origins;            2= French legal origins;           3= German sub-tradition;       4=Scandinavian sub-tradition     
 
A B b  C D E F G H J K 
1 2 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 2 1 
 *** 
0.64    
*** 
0.75 
***  
1.00 
*** 
0.00 
***  
 0.86 
***  
0.59 
*** 
1.10    
*** 
0.06 
*** 
0.50    
*** 
0.83 
* 
0.77 
*** 
0.88 
* 
0.57 
*** 
1.32 
*** 
0.58 
*** 
0.74 
Legal 
Origins 
 
British Common law 
 
11.98 
   
 
-59.77 
  
* 
24.96 
 
 
 
  
0.49 
 
  
     
-14.72 
French Civil law  
 
-10.57 
** 
0.46 
 
15.76   
 
 
1.87 
  
 
1.26 
 
1.67 
 
 
  
-14.87 
 
10.85 
 
German       
 
-10.90 
  
 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
   
Scandinavian           
 
 -6.34    
 Polity IV 
 
0.06   
   
0.08 
   
-0.08 
 
0.05 
 
0.94 
 
1.33 
 
0.13   
 
0.07 
   
0.15 
 
-0.05 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
-0.04 
*** 
1.17 
 
-0.28 
 
-0.01 
Government stability 
* 
-0.16 
 
-0.21    
** 
-0.28 
 
-0.17 
 
-2.42 
 
-1.63 
*  
-2.30 
 
0.02 
 
0.61 
 
0.37 
 
0.38 
 
0.18 
 
-0.02 
  
-0.44 
 
0.03 
 
-0.08 
Bureaucracy Quality 
 
-0.21 
 
-2.15 
 
-0.73 
 
0.07 
 
18.89 
 
-0.32 
 
-0.78      
 
-4.19 
 
0.47 
 
-2.66 
 
-2.39 
 
0.34 
 
1.08 
*** 
-12.68 
   
-2.05 
 
-0.97 
 
 
Institutions 
Rule of law 
 
 
0.40 
 
0.90 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.30 
  
 1.06 
 
-1.84 
 
  5.03 
 
-0.22 
  
-1.08 
 
0.23 
 
0.42 
 
0.06 
 
0.39 
* 
-2.75 
 
0.37 
 
0.20 
Corruption 
 
-0.28 
 
-0.01 
 
0.34 
* 
0.57 
  
 1.85   
 
0.56 
 
-3.52 
  
 0.61 
*** 
-0.97 
 
-0.86 
 
-1.03 
 
0.71 
 
0.52 
 
-0.18 
 
0.45 
 
-0.01 
Human Capital 
(In Average school 15 Years old) 
 
3.23 
 
3.22 
 
-1.39   
 
0.91 
**  
-29.38 
*  
-34.20 
 
-11.70 
 
1.00 
 
3.81 
 
-0.84 
 
1.32 
 
1.51 
 
3.45 
 
-1.37 
 
2.63 
 
-1.08 
Infrastructure 
(Fixed Tel  line) 
 
-0.60 
 
0.04   
 
-1.39 
 
-0.75 
 
14.93 
 
7.88    
*    
17.82 
 
1.13 
  
 -0.97 
 
0.10 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
-0.81 
 
-1.09 
** 
2.21 
 
0.08 
†
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Trade Openness 
 
1.11 
 
-3.25 
 
0.73 
 
-0.94 
*  
22.92 
 
25.63 
***  
23.48   
 
0.85 
* 
-2.86 
 
-1.41 
 
-2.80 
 
1.38 
 
1.13 
*** 
7.37 
 
-5.88 
 
0.12 
Wealth   (GDP per capita) 
 
-1.64 
 
-1.71 
  
1.11 
 
1.49 
  
 5.86   
 
-2.04 
 
-0.96  
  
 -0.54 
 
 2.31  
* 
5.97 
 
7.12 
 
0.39 
 
4.21 
** 
8.55 
*** 
3.89 
 
0.49 
M2/GDP 
 
-1.68   
 
-0.33 
 
0.21 
 
1.55  
 
-23.88  
 
-5.03 
 
-27.26 
0.44  
** 
-2.87 
 
-2.26 
 
-2.91 
 
1.81 
 
-4.40 
*** 
-13.23 
 
-0.03 
 
0.40 
Inflation 
 
0.67 
   
0.52 
 
0.23 
 
0.13 
 
0.41 
 
5.97 
 
 -0.95 
 
012 
 
0.09   
* 
0.73 
 
0.73 
 
0.10 
 
0.22 
 
-0.14 
 
0.15   
 
0.09 
Number of Instruments 19 19 20 20 19 19 19 19 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Number of Country∆ 
(Total:  193) 
48 40 15 9 24 15 13 12 8 9 
Observations 53 53 70 51 47 47 47 55 51 49 49 52 52 40 45 44 
AR1 (p-value) 0.711 0.802 0.730 0.599 0.415 0.368 0.964 0.829 0.289 0.763 0.995 0.360 0.543 0.560 0.996 0.9110 
Wald statistic  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hansen p-value 0.9704 0.9669 0.905 0.941 0.524 0.616 0.420 0.999 0.520 0.996 0.892 0.808 0.910 0.968 1.000 0.9823 
GMM instruments for levels: 
difference (null H = exogenous) 
 
 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
GMM ((ln corruption index, lag(1)) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Hansen test excluding group:      
Difference (null H = exogenous) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
                 
Legal families 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 2 1 
Regions/districts A B b  C D E F G H J K 
Note: (1) Confidence level: ***, **, and* indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
          (2) 
 
We specifically put the countries of Central America and South America in group (b), which exclude the island countries in the Caribbean in order to assess the 
FDI activities solely in those larger countries in the continents  
          (3)  The corresponding figures taken to support our analytic results are underlined for easier reference 
          (4)  ∆  The total number of countries in the world =  the sum of the countries in each of the regions =48+40+15+9+24+15+13+12+8+9=193 countries/districts 
 
 
 
†
†
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 (Group A) 
  Table 6: System GMM regression of levels of FDI Inflows to countries by regions classified by Colonial Powers theory 
FDI 
Colonial Powers 
A= Sub-Sahara;              B=Latin America and the Caribbean;        C=Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia;      D=Southern Asia;             E=Mediterranean (Western Asia +North Africa) ;               
F= Post-Soviet States (Eastern Europe + Central Asia);                             G=North Atlantic Ocean (Northern America + Southern Europe);                   H=Southern Europe                                     
J= Western Europe;       K= Oceania                                                   
 1= Former English;       2=Former French ;      3=Spanish Colony;        4=Portuguese Colony;       5=German never colonised;       6=Japanese Colony;     7= Austro-Hungarian          
 8= Ottoman Colony;     9= Spanish colony excluding the Caribbean;   10=Dutch colony;              11=mixed legal origin                  12=others    
 A B C D E F G H J K 
 
11 4 2 1 1 3 4 9 10 5 1 6 12 1 8 7 12 1 2 2 1 
 *** 
0.71 
*** 
0.87 
*** 
0.88 
*** 
0.76 
*** 
0.91 
** 
0.69 
*** 
1.23 
*** 
0.62 
*** 
0.98 
*** 
0.65 
*** 
0.76 
*** 
0.65 
*** 
0.92 
*** 
0.75 
*** 
1.02 
*** 
0.95 
** 
0.17 
*** 
0.64 
*** 
1.50 
*** 
0.51 
*** 
0.74 
Colonia
l 
Powers 
 
Former English    
 
-4.01 
 
-6.03 
 
 
   
 
-27.28 
  
 
12.05 
   
** 
4.24 
  
 
-28.38 
Former French   
 
5.46 
   
 
           -26.71 
 
2.23 
 
Spanish colony      
** 
11.21 
  
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portuguese colony  
 
-0.82 
    
 
-11.80 
              
German never 
colonised 
      
 
  
 
-0.02 
           
Austro-
Hungarian 
      
 
        5.92      
Ottoman colony       
 
       
 
4.79 
      
Spanish colony 
excluding the 
Caribbean 
      
 *** 
8.95 
             
Dutch colony       
 
 
 
1.92 
            
Mixed legal origin  
 
3.98 
     
 
              
Others       
 
     
** 
10.12 
   
** 
15.49 
    
 Polity IV 
 
0.10 
 
0.03 
 
0.12 
 
0.09 
 
-0.07 
*** 
-0.21 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.03 
 
1.35 
 
0.04 
 
1.36 
 
-0.07 
 
0.12 
 
0.26 
 
-0.67 
** 
-0.59 
 
1.31 
*** 
2.50 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.00 
Bureaucracy 
 
-0.95 
 
-0.54 
 
0.00 
 
-1.09 
 
-1.43 
 
1.21 
 
0.93 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.91 
 
-0.38 
 
1.23 
 
-0.38 
  
 1.46 
 
12.69 
 
1.33 
*** 
-12.40 
** 
-2.48 
 
5.31 
*** 
-24.56 
0.04 
 
-0.97 
Government 
stability 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.30 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.23 
 
-1.53 
 
-0.11 
 
-1.53 
  
 0.41 
 
-0.41 
 
0.62 
 
-0.14 
 
0.23 
 
0.46 
*** 
1.22 
 
0.07 
 
-0.08 
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Instituti
ons 
Rule of 
law 
 
 
0.58 
 
0.28 
 
0 .96 
 
-0.27 
 
-0.27 
 
-0.05 
 
1.03 
 
-0.34 
 
-0.27 
 
-2.25 
 
-0.52 
 
-2.25 
   
0.22 
 
-1.47 
 
-1.11 
 
0.32 
* 
1.08 
 
0.60 
* 
0.81 
 
0.49 
 
0.20 
Corrupt
ion 
 
-0.08 
 
0.15 
 
-0.12 
 
0.16 
* 
0.51 
 
0.39 
 
0.18 
 
0.27 
 
0.37 
 
0.70 
 
0.15 
 
0.70 
 
-0.58 
 
2.10 
 
-0.86 
 
0.28 
*** 
-1.06 
 
-0.07 
 
0.29 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.01 
Human Capital 
In Average school 15 
Years old 
 
3.69 
 
1.62 
 
-2.00 
 
3.46 
* 
-2.45 
 
-2.57 
 
-2.31 
 
-0.39 
 
-0.92 
* 
-34.47 
 
-5.54 
 
2.21 
 
17.78 
 
-13.85 
 
3.22 
 
-3.14 
 
-1.31 
 
8.97 
*** 
36.21 
 
-0.79 
 
-1.08 
Infrastructure 
(Fixed Tel  line) 
 
-0.36 
 
0.34 
 
0.36 
 
-0.19 
 
-1.67 
 
0.09 
 
-0.63 
 
-0.02 
 
0.30 
 
0.735 
 
1.07 
* 
7.47 
 
-2.38 
 
3.20 
 
-0.44 
* 
3.09 
 
3.08 
*** 
12.40 
 
-0.29 
 
1.36 
 
0.08 
Trade Openness  
-0.29 
 
2.45 
 
2.14 
 
-0.09 
*  
1.62 
 
0.80 
 
0.06 
 
-0.12 
 
0.59 
 
23.20 
 
3.37 
 
23.21 
 
-2.37 
 
3.20 
 
2.92 
 
3.80 
 
5.13 
** 
5.08 
*** 
4.25 
-0.93 
 
0.12 
Wealth   (GDP 
per capita) 
 
-2.68 
 
-2.34 
 
-0.16 
 
-2.74 
 
1.26 
 
2.73 
 
1.03 
 
0.00 
 
0.72 
 
-1.63 
 
-0.66 
 
-2.05 
 
1.02 
 
-3.04 
 
2.46 
 
12.05 
 
16.69 
 
0.28 
** 
10.33 
*** 
3.38 
 
0.49 
M2/GDP  
-1.85 
 
-2.84 
 
-1.58 
 
-1.95 
 
0.97 
 
-0.28 
 
-0.01 
 
0.10 
 
0.21 
 
-4.12 
 
0.64 
 
-4.12 
 
-4.03 
 
-3.04 
 
-4.31 
** 
-9.98 
** 
-12.95 
 
-1.03 
*** 
-29.59 
 
-0.55 
 
0.40 
Inflation  
0.49 
 
0.46 
 
0.17 
 
0.52 
 
0.25 
 
0.09 
 
0.57 
 
0.03 
 
0.30 
 
5.73 
 
-0.14 
 
5.73 
 
-0.89 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
*** 
0.74 
** 
1.05 
 
0.38 
*** 
-1.23 
* 
0.32 
 
0.09 
Number of Instruments 
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18 19 19 19 19 20 19 19 19 15 19 
Number of Country∆ 
(Total:  193) 
48 40 15 9 24 15 13 12 8 9 
Observations 
54 54 54 54 70 70 70 51 70 47 47 47 47 55 51 41 41 52 40 45 44 
AR1 (p-value) 0.891 0.922 0.899 0.932 0.956 0.787 0.766 0,501 0.964 0.429 0.410 0.859 0.797 0.405 0.564 0.434 0.824 0.724 0.968 0.902 0.799 
Wald statistic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hansen p-value 0.893 0.904 0.879 0.992 0.927 0.923 0.956 0.948 0.420 0.600 0.562 1.000 0.722 0.601 0.982 0.745 0.884 0.962 1.000 0.990 0.896 
GMM instruments for levels: 
difference (null H = exogenous) 
 
 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
GMM  (ln corruption 
index, lag 1)  
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Hansen test excluding group: 
Difference (null H = exogenous) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
                      
Legal families 11 4 2 1 1 3 4 9 10 5 1 6 12 1 8 7 12 1 2 2 1 
Regions/districts A B C D E F G H J K 
Note: (1) Confidence level: ***, **, and* indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
          (2) The corresponding figures taken to support our analytic results are underlined for easier reference 
          (3) ∆  The total number of countries in the world =  the sum of the countries in each of the regions =48+40+15+9+24+15+13+12+8+9=193 countries/districts 
 (4) The results of Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions as shown in the Tables 5 to 6 are mostly over 0.5. This indicates that the orthogonality conditions cannot 
be rejected at 5% level or even at 1% level, and the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. Moreover, the first order autocorrelation (AR1) in the 
tables are at the p-value larger than 0.05, which indicate that the null hypothesis of the serial correlation test in the errors in the first-difference regression exhibits no 
second-order serial correlation. Therefore, our analysis fulfils the basic requirements for GMM estimation. 
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 (Group B) 
                 Table 7: System GMM regression of levels of FDI Inflows as percentage of real GDP to countries by regions classified by Legal Origins theory 
FDI 
Legal Origins 
A= Sub-Sahara;              B=Latin America and the Caribbean;                 b= Latin America only without the Caribbean;          C=Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia;      
D=Southern Asia;           E=Mediterranean (Western Asia + North Africa);     F= Post-Soviet States (Eastern Europe + Central Asia);      G= North Atlantic Ocean (Northern America + Southern Europe);              
H= Southern Europe;     J=Western Europe;                                              K= Oceania;                                                    
1=English legal origins;            2= French legal origins;           3= German sub-tradition;          4= Scandinavian sub-tradition  
 
A B b  C D E F G H J K 
1 2 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 2 1 
 * 
0.28 
 
0.31 
*** 
0.19 
 
0.12 
 
1.14 
** 
1.84 
 
2.61 
 
0.30 
 
0.19 
*** 
0.46 
 
0.38 
** 
0.33 
*** 
3.58 
 
2.46 
 
6.88 
 
0.39 
Legal 
Origins 
 
British Common law 
 
0.79 
   
 
-0.03 
  
 
-0.32 
  
  
-6.69 
 
  
 
-0.31 
French Civil law  
 
2.34 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.22 
 
 
14.42 
  
 
-0.89 
 
-0.19 
 
 
  
-7.77 
 
6.30 
 
German       
 
3.82 
  
 
 
 
0.35 
 
 
   
Scandinavian           
 
 
 
-3.11 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polity IV 
 
0.05 
 
0.05 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 
-0.33 
 
-0.55 
 
-0.44 
 
0.06 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.01 
 
 0.09 
** 
1.79 
 
0.08 
 
-0.11 
 
-2.94 
 
0.04 
Government stability 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
* 
-0.23 
 
0.59 
 
1.96 
 
0.83 
 
0.10 
 
0.21 
 
-0.47 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.98 
 
-1.48 
 
0.66 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.05 
Bureaucracy Quality 
 
0.50 
 
0.44 
 
-0.47 
 
-0.19 
 
10.09 
 
25.01 
 
17.77 
 
0.04 
 
-0.85 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.53 
** 
-13.08 
*** 
-13.91 
 
-0.94 
 
-25.66 
 
-4.63 
 
 
Institutions 
Rule of 
law 
 
 
0.41 
 
0.35 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.23 
 
2.35 
 
7.65 
* 
3.83 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.39 
* 
0.66 
 
0.01 
 
0.85 
 
1.26 
 
0.43 
 
-3.35 
 
1.12 
Corruption 
* 
-0.47 
 
-0.26 
** 
0.31 
*** 
0.48 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.96 
 
0.46 
*** 
0.28 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.69 
 
-0.08 
* 
1.09 
** 
1.53 
 
-0.83 
 
1.89 
 
-0.50 
Human Capital 
(In Average school 15 Years old) 
 
-0.39 
 
0.82 
 
-0.77 
 
-0.21 
 
6.23 
 
19.44 
 
10.94 
 
0.87 
 
0.86 
 
-0.39 
 
-1.13 
 
8.81 
 
4.93 
*** 
20.47 
 
23.33 
* 
-0.94 
†
1FDI
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Infrastructure 
(Fixed Tel  line) 
 
0.39 
 
0.34 
 
0.09 
 
0.25 
 
-0.07 
* 
7.26 
 
0.59 
 
0.01 
 
0.17 
 
0.19 
 
0.12 
* 
7.84 
** 
4.05 
** 
1.22 
 
-18.26 
 
0.23 
Trade Openness 
 
1.05 
 
0.34 
 
0.18 
 
0.23 
 
3.72 
 
9.51 
 
6.44 
 
-0.30 
 
 
2.05 
 
0.48 
 
-0.08 
 
0.85 
** 
6.27 
 
2.05 
 
-51.66 
 
-1.27 
 
 
 
Wealth   (GDP per 
capita) 
 
1.28 
 
-0.32 
 
-0.23 
* 
-0.96 
 
3.82 
 
13.08 
 
4.76 
** 
-0.65 
 
0.86 
 
0.14 
 
0.68 
 
-6.05 
*** 
10.02 
 
-0.13 
 
52.01 
 
1.67 
M2/GDP 
 
-1.16 
 
-1.58 
 
0.00 
 
-0.06 
 
-5.29 
 
-21.92 
 
-9.43 
* 
0.62 
 
-0.75 
 
-0.26 
 
0.68 
* 
9.53 
** 
-6.83 
 
-6.47 
 
-31.98 
 
0.37 
Inflation 
 
0.27 
 
0.25 
 
0.03 
 
0.01 
 
-0.26 
* 
0.52 
 
-0.16 
* 
0.54 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.00 
 
0.19 
 
0.88 
*** 
0.90 
 
0.18 
 
-2.44 
 
-0.12 
Number of Instruments 19 20 20 20 19 19 19 17 20 19 19 20 19 20 19 19 
Number of Country∆ 
(Total:  193) 
48 40 15 9 24 15 13 12 8 9 
Observations 50 50 90 72 44 44 44 50 58 50 50 44 44 45 55 41 
AR1 (p-value) 0.789 0.681 0.996 0.819 0.878 0.727 0.320 0.889 0.669 0.808 0.892 0.792 0.766 0.725 0.997 0.875 
Wald statistic  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hansen p-value 0.870 0.970 0.923 0.913 0.764 0.746 0.875 1.000 0.842 0.904 1.000 0.913 0.672 0.948 1.000 1.000 
GMM instruments for levels: 
difference (null H = exogenous) 
 
 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.937 0.942 1.000 1.000 0.229 0.602 1.000 0.863 0.880 0.232 1.000 1.000 
GMM ((ln corruption index, 
lag(1)) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.699 0.688 1.000 1.000 0.753 0.990 1.000 0.954 0.779 0.718 1.000 1.000 
Hansen test excluding group:      
Difference (null H = exogenous) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.717 0.709 1.000 1.000 0.867 0.999 1.000 0.878 0.902 0.929 1.000 1.000 
                 
Legal families 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 2 1 
Regions/districts A B C D E F G H J K 
Note: (1) Confidence level: ***, **, and* indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
          (2) 
 
We specifically put the countries of Central America and South America in group (b), which exclude the island countries in the Caribbean in order to assess the 
FDI activities solely in those larger countries in the continents  
          (3)  The corresponding figures taken to support our analytic results are underlined for easier reference 
          (4)  ∆  The total number of countries in the world =  the sum of the countries in each of the regions =48+40+15+9+24+15+13+12+8+9=193 countries/districts 
 
 
 
 
†
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 (Group B) 
Table 8: System GMM regression of levels of FDI Inflows as percentage of real GDP to countries by regions classified by colonial Powers  
FDI 
Colonial Powers 
A= Sub-Sahara;              B=Latin America and the Caribbean;        C=Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia;     D=Southern Asia;             E=Mediterranean (western Asia +North Africa);               
F= Post-Soviet States (Eastern Europe +Central Asia);                              G= North Atlantic Ocean ( Northern America and Northern Europe);             H=Southern Europe;                                                             
J= Western Europe;       K= Oceania                                                   
1= Former English;      2=Former French;   3=Spanish Colony;             4=Portuguese Colony;     5=German never colonised;     6=Japanese Colony;      7= Austro-Hungarian     
8= Ottoman Colony;    9= Spanish colony excluding the Caribbean;    10=Dutch colony;             11=mixed legal origin ;             12=others  
 A B C D E F G H J K 
 
11 4 2 1 1 3 4 9 10 5 1 6 12 1 8 7 12 1 2 2 1 
 ** 
0.33 
 
0.18 
** 
0.30 
*** 
0.35 
 
0.42 
*** 
0.03 
 
0.04 
 
0.06 
* 
0.21 
 
0.84 
 
0.47 
 
0.84 
*** 
0.87 
 
0.04 
 
0.02 
 
0.30 
 
0.15 
 
1.55 
 
0.32 
 
11.12 
 
0.39 
 
Former English    
 
1.29 
 
-2.29 
 
 
   
*** 
-6.17 
  
 
-2.49 
   
 
11.25 
  
 
-0.03 
Former French   
 
-1.15 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
3.99 
 
-113.09 
 
Spanish colony   
 
 
 
 
  
*** 
2.06 
 
              
Portuguese colony  
 
1.04   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.69 
              
German never 
Colonised 
      
 
  
** 
-26.70 
           
Austro-
Hungarian 
      
 
        
 
2.27 
     
Ottoman colony       
 
       2.09       
Spanish colony 
excluding the 
Caribbean 
  
 
 
   
 ** 
5.62 
             
Dutch colony       
 
 
 
-3.77 
            
Mixed legal origin  2.22          
 
              
Others       
 
     
** 
19.12 
   
** 
1.40 
    
 
Polity IV 
 
 
0.02    
 
0.04   
 
0.05 
  
0.02 
 
0.06 
 
0.00 
 
0.08 
 
-0.03 
 
0.06  
 
-0.03 
* 
-0.23 
 
-0.03  
** 
-0.11 
 
-0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
-1.66 
 
0.24 
 
-3.97 
 
0.04 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
 
0.34  
 
0.17 
 
0.52 
 
0.39 
 
-0.16 
 
0.16 
 
-0.40 
 
0.56 
 
-0.32 
 
-0.51 
 
5.10 
 
-0.51 
   
0.47 
 
-0.02 
 
-1.29 
 
0.21 
 
-0.17 
 
-5.65 
 
-2.11 
 
-15.93 
 
 -4.63 
Government 
Stability 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.09    
 
-0.05 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.17 
 
0.19 
 
-0.17 
 
0.02 
* 
-0.23 
 
0.18 
 
-0.03 
 
0.00 
** 
-0.66 
 
0.29 
 
-0.80 
** 
-0.05 
1FDI
itX
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Instituti
ons 
rule of 
law 
 
* 
0.80 
 
0.34 
 
0.41   
 
  0.79 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.09 
 
0.28 
* 
1.35 
 
0.28 
*** 
0.73 
 
-0.41 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.07 
 
1.12 
* 
0.44 
 
-0.40 
  
1.120 
Corrupti
on 
** 
-0.62 
 
-0.50 
** 
-0.46 
* 
-0.63   
*** 
0.20 
** 
0.23 
 
0.35 
** 
0.36 
** 
0.28 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.52 
 
-0.15 
*** 
-0.83 
 
-0.43 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.07 
 
1.75 
 
-0.65 
 
-0.47 
 
-0.50 
Human Capital 
Average Secondary 
School 15 
 
-1.24 
   
0.44 
 
-0.41 
 
-1.50 
 
-0.93 
 
0.40 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.44 
 
-0.56  
 
0.31 
 *  
4.27 
 
0.31 
 
 2.28 
 
-6.79   
  
 0.41 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.23 
  
 8.90 
** 
21.76 
 
31.07 
* 
-0.94 
Infrastructure 
(Fixed Tel  line) 
 
 
0.42 
 
0.30 
 
0.43 
  
 0.44 
 
-0.17 
 
0.12 
 
0.09 
 
0.29 
 
0.11  
 
0.48 
 
-0.38 
 
0.48   
 
0.46  
* 
0.99   
 
-0.26 
 
0.10 
 
0.01 
*   
8.49  
** 
1.53 
   
-22.51 
 
0.23 
Trade Openness 
 
0.73 
 
-0.53 
 
1.38 
  
0.88 
 
0.34 
 
0.35 
 
0.25 
 
0.43 
 
0.12 
 
-0.49 
   
2.43 
 
-0.49 
  
2.10 
* 
1.48 
 
2.88 
 
0.04 
 
0.93 
  
 5.31 
 
3.49 
* 
-75.67 
 
-1.27 
Wealth   (GDP 
per capita) 
 
0.64 
 
0.90 
   
1.72 
 
0.99 
 
0.04 
 
0.07 
 
-0.35 
 
0.29 
  
 -0.27 
 
-0.73 
 
0.10 
  
 -0.73 
 
1.87 
  
 -0.06 
   
1.17 
 
-0.05 
 
0.19 
 
-2.17 
 
-1.47 
* 
64.19 
 
1.67 
M2/GDP 
   
1.44   
 
-0.93 
 
-1.47 
 
1.30 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.29 
 
-0.09 
   
0.30 
 
-0.97 
   
0.30 
* 
-3.96 
  
 1.15   
 
-1.11 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.37 
 
-3.20 
 
-6.60 
* 
-34.56 
 
0.37 
Inflation 
 
0.27  
   
0.22 
 
0.33 
 
0.30 
 
0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.32 
 
-0.08 
 
0.32 
 
0.08 
 
-0.13  
 
-0.11 
 
0.04 
 
-0.03 
   
0.07 
 
0.43 
 
-0.82 
 
-0.12 
Number of Instruments 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Number of Country∆ 
(Total:  193) 
48 40 15 9 24 15 13 12 8 9 
Observations 50 50 50  50 90 90 90 72 90 44 44 44 50 50 64 50 50 42 45 45 41 
AR1 (p-value) 0.910 0.922 0.899 0.932 0.956 0.787 0.698 0.501 0.964 0.429 0.410 0.859 0.789 0.405 0.564 0.434 0.886 0.724 0.968 0.902 
 
0.799 
 
 
 
 
Wald statistics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hansen p-value 0.890 0.904 0.879 0.992 0.927 0.923 0.966 0.947 0.420 0.600 0.562 1.000 0.922 0.601 0.982 0.745 0.890 0.962 1.000 0.990 0.896 
GMM instruments for 
levels:difference (null H = 
exogenous) 
 
exogenous) 
 
 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
GMM ((ln_corruption_index, 
lag(1)) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Hansen test excluding group:      
Difference (null H = exogenous) 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
                      
Legal families 11 4 2 1 1 3 4 9 10 5 1 6 12 1 8 7 12 1 2 2 1 
Regions/districts A 
 
B C D E F G H J K 
Note:  (1) Confidence level: ***, **, and* indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
         (2) The corresponding figures taken to support our analytic results are underlined for easier reference 
           (3) ∆  The total number of countries in the world =  the sum of the countries in each of the regions =48+40+15+9+24+15+13+12+8+9=193 countries/districts
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